In this paper we design a protocol to extract random bits with an arbitrarily low bias from a single arbitrarily weak min-entropy block source in a device independent setting. The protocol employs Mermin devices that exhibit super-classical correlations. Number of devices used scales polynomially in the length of the block n, containing entropy of at least two bits. Our protocol is robust, it can tolerate devices that malfunction with a probability dropping polynomially in n at the cost of constant increase of the number of devices used.
INTRODUCTION
High quality randomness is a very useful resource in many computation and cryptographic tasks. In fact it has been shown that many protocols, including quantum ones, vitally require perfect randomness for their security.
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Unfortunately, even though we cannot fully predict certain processes it is very difficult to argue that they produce perfect randomness -independent and unbiased bits. The problem of imperfect randomness has a long history in classical computer science and long line of research was devoted to randomness extraction -algorithms to transform imperfect sources of randomness into (close to) perfect ones. 3 The drawback of randomness extractors are twofold. Firstly, extractors typically require at least two independent sources of (imperfect) randomness. Worse still, even imperfect randomness of classical processes has to be assumed, because in principle classical physics is deterministic. Quantum physics, with its intrinsic randomness allows us, in theory, to drop the second assumption. Preparation of a pure state and measurement in its complementary basis will yield a perfectly random result. In practice, however, we are replacing the assumption of randomness by yet another assumption -perfect control of quantum devices. This assumption is also very problematic, as we have learned in case of quantum key distribution. Luckily enough, thanks to Bell-type experiments, it is possible to certify by classical procedures that quantum processes are being observed and therefore intrinsic randomness is being produced. This is the basic idea behind device independent randomness extraction. Effectively, we are exchanging the assumption of independent randomness of the second source by a much weaker assumption -validity of quantum mechanics. Alternatively, one can view device-independent randomness extraction as quantum protocol for extracting randomness from a single weak source -a task that is classically impossible.
In this paper we work with (n, k)block min-entropy random sources. These are sources with n-bit blocks of output with guaranteed min-entropy k. Such a source can be modeled as a sequence of n-bit random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , such that
where E is a random variable describing all adversary's information about the source and I(E) is it's image. Therefore, each new block has high min-entropy, even conditioned on the previous ones and any information of the adversary. This is a generalization of Santha-Vazirani sources, 5 which can be viewed as block sources with n = 1.
Note that the task of transforming a single block source into a fully random bit is known to be impossible. Furthermore, it is impossible to turn a block source with n > 1 into Santha-Vazirani source, therefore we cannot use existing randomness extraction protocols.
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It is also worth to note that similar results were independently obtained by Chung, Shi and Wu. 10 The main difference between the two results is that we work with min-entropy block sources, while their results hold also for general min-entropy sources.
DEVICE INDEPENDENT CONCEPT AND MERMIN INEQUALITY
In this paper we use the three-partite Mermin inequality. Let's consider three non-communicating boxes, each of them having a single bit input and a single bit output. Let us denote the input bits of the respective boxes by X, Y and Z and the corresponding output bits A, B and C. Input bits are correlated and it holds that XY Z ∈ {111, 100, 010, 001}. The inputs are simultaneously passed to all boxes, so each box only knows it's input. The value v of the Mermin term is a function of the 4 conditional probabilities defined by the behavior of the device and of the probability distribution on inputs
In particular, for the uniform input distribution we set P (XY Z = 111) = P (XY Z = 010) = P (XY Z = 001) = P (XY Z = 100) = ) and there exists a classical device that can make any 3 conditional probabilities simultaneously equal to 1. With the use of quantum mechanics we can achieve v u = 1 and satisfy perfectly all 4 conditional probabilities using the tripartite GHZ state
(|000 +|111 ) and measuring σ X (σ Y ) when receiving 0 (1) on input.
The beautiful property of the Mermin inequality is that the violation v gives us directly the probability that the device passes a specific test
where addition and product are both taken modulo 2. The probability of failing the test is therefore 1 − v.
Mironowicz and Pawlowski 9 showed the following result: Take a linearly ordered sequence of Mermin devices D 1 ...D ( being arbitrary) that have uniform distribution on inputs, and each device knows inputs and outputs of its predecessors, but devices cannot signal to its predecessors. Let us assume that the inputs of devices are described by random variables XY Z 1 , . . . , XY Z , and the outputs by ABC 1 , . . . , ABC . Then there exists a function f (ε) such that if the value of the Mermin term (2) using uniform inputs is at least v u ≥ f (ε), then the output bit A has a bias at most ε conditioned on the input and output of all its predecessors and the adversarial knowledge. This function can be lower bounded by a Semi-Definite Program (SDP) using any level of the hierarchy introduced in. 12 By using the second level of the hierarchy one can obtain the bound on f (ε) as a function of ε shown in Fig.(1) . We can set = 1 (having just a single device) and get the lower bound on the detection probability of producing a bit biased by more than ε, which is greater than 1 − f (ε). Our protocol uses many devices, which are forbidden to communicate at all, therefore they can be ordered arbitrarily and thus this limit holds for all of these devices simultaneously.
SINGLE-ROUND PROTOCOL
In the rest of our analysis we will be working with (n, k) block sources for an arbitrary n and k ≥ 2. This is to simplify the explanation, since by taking 2 k blocks of an arbitrary (n , k ) source with k > 0 we get a (n, k) source with n = 2 k n and k = 2 k k ≥ 2. Let us start with a min-entropy (n, 2) source (recall that (n, k) source with k > 2 is also an (n, 2) source) and define N = 2 n . Let H = {h 1 , . . . , h m } be a family of hash functions s.t. h i : {0, ..., N − 1} → {0, 1, 2, 3}. Each hash-function h i is used to provide input for a Mermin-type device D i , where outputs of the function 0, 1, 2, 3 identify 111, 100, 010, 001 inputs for the device.
We want to construct H with the property that for every 4-element set S ⊆ {0, . . . , N − 1} there exist at least one hash function h ∈ H such that h(S) = {0, 1, 2, 3}. This is trivially satisfied for the set of all possible hashing functions H f ull = {0, 1, 2, 3} N , however, such a class of functions with its 4 N elements is impractically large. There exists a construction of such class of hash functions with logarithmic number of functions in N (see 13 ), thus the number of devices needed scales polynomially with the length of the sequence n. We also stress that for large n one hash function covers as many as 9% of all four-tuples, independently on n. So the size of an optimal set of hash functions might not depend on n at all. Let us denote m = |H|. The protocol works as follows:
1. Obtain a (weakly) random n bit string r from the (n, k) block source.
2. Into each device D i input the 3 bit string r i chosen from set {111, 100, 010, 001} -each one corresponding to one of the possible outputs of h i (r) -and obtain the outputs A i , B i and C i .
Verify whether for each device
If this is not true, abort the protocol.
The protocol is depicted in the Fig. 2. (n, k) Figure 2 . Depiction of a single round protocol. Bit string drawn from the flat random source is hashed into m inputs into Mermin devices so that at least one device receives all four inputs with non-zero probability. This guarantees at least one result almost perfectly random with high probability, which holds also for the product of individual results.
Let us now examine the properties of the bit b i . First consider only flat (n, 2) distributions. Recall that these are exactly distributions that are uniform on 4-element subsets of the sample space. Our construction of the class H of hash functions assures that for any flat probability distribution there is a function h j ∈ H and the corresponding device D j such that inputs of D j (hashed by h j ) are uniform. Although output bits A i are not independent in general, as most of them can be produced by fully deterministic strategies, (1) together with the arbitrary ordering we can impose on devices {D i } m i=1 we have that if the adversary wants to bias (conditioned on the inputs and outputs of other devices) A j by amount greater than ε, she must risk getting caught with probability at least 1 − f (ε). Therefore A j is partially independent of other {A i |i = j}, and the output of the round b is biased by at most ε with probability at least 1 − f (ε).
The set of all (n, 2) distributions is convex and flat distributions are exactly all extremal points of this convex set.
14 Thus any (n, 2) distribution d can be expressed as a convex combination of at most N (n, 2) flat
The lower bound on probability that the adversary is not detected is given by the successful cheating probabilities when using flat
averaged through the probability distribution on these flat distributions
Thus the upper bound v u ≤ f (ε) holds for non-flat distributions as well.
To summarize this part, having an (n, k) source with k ≥ 2, with a single round of a protocol, we can produce a single bit that is biased at most by ε with a certainty of 1 − f (ε).
MULTIPLE-ROUND PROTOCOL
Let us state the most general task: we have an (n, k) block source with arbitrary n and k ≥ 2. We would like to produce a bit that is biased by no more than ε with certainty of at least 1 − δ.
If the one-round version does not meet these parameters, we will repeat the whole protocol l times. By using new devices and new outputs of the block source, each of the runs j will produce a bit b j that is biased by ε from perfectly random bit conditioned on all the previous bits {b i |i < j} up to a probability f (ε). Thus, in order to achieve the bias of the output bit
of at least ε, all bits b i has to have at least this bias. Therefore, after l rounds, the probability of the adversary not being detected will be upper bounded by f (ε) l . Note that the product form does not come from the fact that the detection probabilities are independent (they are not). This is a product of a chain of conditional probabilities. Recall that the bound f (ε) holds conditioned on any inputs and outputs of the previous devices (in an arbitrarily ordering that respects the causality). Thus choosing l > log δ log f (ε) (6) will guarantee the fulfillment of the conditions for the parameters ε and δ.
Summing up, with an (n, k) block source and O log δ log f (ε) P oly n 2 k
Mermin devices we can produce a single random bit with bias smaller than ε with probability larger than 1 − δ.
For producing more bits we simply repeat the whole procedure: all the bits produced will have bias smaller than ε conditioned on the bits produced so far, with linear scaling of the resources.
ROBUSTNESS
Aborting the protocol after even a single mistake of the devices is certainly highly impractical from the implementation point of view. Therefore we expand our analysis to a situation where we tolerate certain noise on the devices, which would manifest itself by occasional failing of the test condition even for honest devices. More specifically, we shall tolerate a certain fraction of the devices to malfunction without aborting the protocol.
In more technical version of this work 13 we show, that if we tolerate
devices to fail in the whole protocol and want to achieve security parameters ε, δ we can do so by increasing l > 8 ln δ f (ε) − 1 .
